It\u27s Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need Warrants to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices by Ganz, John S.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 95
Issue 4 Summer Article 4
Summer 2005
It's Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should
Not Need Warrants to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking
Devices
John S. Ganz
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
John S. Ganz, It's Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need Warrants to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices, 95 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 1325 (2004-2005)
0091-4169/05/9504-1325
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL AW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 95, No. 04
Copyright © 2005 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
COMMENTS
IT'S ALREADY PUBLIC: WHY FEDERAL
OFFICERS SHOULD NOT NEED




A technology previously associated with military "smart bombs" now
offers police proven, substantial value in investigating the movements of
criminal suspects. Global Positioning System (GPS)-based surveillance
systems enable police to cheaply and easily gather intelligence and evidence
they would otherwise have to obtain through more costly, cumbersome and
risky means such as physical "tails" by pursuing officers.1 The efficiency
gains GPS tracking provides are especially significant because they enable
police to extend their operational capability with minimal incremental
spending.2
In a recent case in Washington State, police used GPS trackers
attached to a murder suspect's car and truck to quickly locate the remote
wilderness grave in which the suspect had buried the body of his nine-year-
old victim. 3 The information proved critical to prosecutors in obtaining a
conviction.4
While the use of GPS tracking devices grows among law enforcement,
federal law remains largely undefined regarding the need to obtain warrants
* J.D. Candidate 2006, Northwestern University School of Law.
See discussion infra Parts II.B, IV.B.2.
2 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
3 State v. Jackson, 46 P.3d 257, 260 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); see discussion infra Part
III.F.2.b.
4 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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before their deployment. State law presents a similarly mixed picture:
while California and Nevada courts ruled that no warrants are required
before using GPS devices, 5 the Washington Supreme Court6 and a county
court in New York 7 recently ruled that police must obtain warrants before
conducting GPS-based surveillance. These rulings followed a 1988 Oregon
State Supreme Court ruling requiring state police officers to obtain warrants
before using "beeper" transmitters, the technological precursors to GPS.8
The federal-state split is a function of differing constitutional
conceptions of personal privacy. 9 Federal courts have not required police to
get warrants to use electronic tracking devices because the information
gathered through them-such as the movement of a car or airplane through
public thoroughfares-is already publicly available. Put another way,
federal law recognizes no legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to
movement in public. 10 This notion is especially true for cars, which federal
courts grant even less protection with respect to search and seizure."
More recently, some state courts and groups such as the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) cited the level and precision of information
GPS trackers collect relative to beepers in arguing that their use should be
subject to a warrant requirement.' 2 These groups conceive of GPS as a
substitute police officer who gathers and stores precise, detailed data which
goes well beyond that available through less sophisticated tracking
devices.' 3 As such, these parties consider GPS substantially more intrusive
than beepers and therefore worthy of heightened procedural restraints.
These arguments have succeeded at the state level because state law
privacy protections often exceed those provided under federal law. 14 While
federal law merely prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in limited
situations, several state constitutions, like those of Oregon and Washington,
adopt a broader conception of privacy which includes protection against
government scrutiny.15 Absent warrants, state and local law enforcement
agencies operating under these more far-reaching constitutions can neither
5 People v. Zichwic, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733, 742-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Osburn v. State,
44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002); see discussion infra Part III.F.1.
6 See discussion infra Part III.F.2.b.
7 See discussion infra Part III.F.2.c.
8 See discussion infra Part III.F.2.a.
9 See discussion infra Parts III.A. 1, III.F.
10 See discussion infra Part III.A. 1.
11 See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
12 See discussion infra Parts III.F.2.b, III.F.2.c.
13 See discussion infra Part III.F.2.b.
14 See discussion infra Parts III.F.2.a, III.F.2.b.
15 See discussion infra Parts III.F.2.a, III.F.2.b.
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invade a protected space nor engage in systematic forms of scrutiny, such as
deployment of GPS trackers.1 6
This Comment provides a legal argument 17 that GPS-based tracking of
vehicles in public areas does not implicate the Fourth Amendment and
therefore should not be subject to warrant requirements-provided such
tracking does not pierce the exterior of a vehicle or enable police to track
movement inside a legitimately private space. To the extent a state
constitution is consistent with federal law, that state should follow this
approach. Fundamentally, the information that law enforcement obtains
through GPS tracking is already available, either without technological
assistance or with less sophisticated tracking technology. As such, it is
legally insignificant in terms of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
This clarification is critical because GPS technology offers substantial
promise in improving the quality of evidence available to law
enforcement.' 8  The fact that GPS provides a new form of technical
evidence-similar to video surveillance or audiotape of conversations-
argues in favor of encouraging its use because judges and juries could, at
least theoretically, rely more comfortably upon it than they would less
reliable information, such as witness testimony. Moreover, by overlaying
GPS tracks with other electronic intelligence such as recorded phone
conversations, police develop a richer, more accurate understanding of their
targets, one which can aid juries in deciding a case.
1 9
From a policy perspective, the practical limits of resources available to
law enforcement in the post-9/11 era argue in favor of GPS usage because
the technology greatly enhances law enforcement efficiency. 20 And while
critics argue GPS represents a danger to individual liberty, the technology
can just as easily be used to attack public corruption: officials in New
Jersey, for instance, used GPS tracking to prosecute police officers charged
with falsifying records and other forms of misconduct.21
Part II explains the technological basics of tracking technology and
possible law enforcement uses of GPS.
Part III first examines the federal constitutional law of search and
seizure relevant to the installation and monitoring of electronic tracking
devices. It then examines recent developments in state law.
16 See discussion infra Parts III.F.2.a, III.F.2.b.
17 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
18 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
19 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
20 See discussion infra Parts II.B, IV.B.2.
21 See discussion infra Part II.B.
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Part IV argues the case for continued, warrantless use of GPS-based
devices to track suspect vehicles traveling in public, at least on the federal
level. Additionally, this Part argues that the same principles should apply
on the state level when state constitutions provide limited privacy
protections similar to those in the United States Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. TECHNOLOGIES IN QUESTION, CAPABILITIES AND LIMITS
Two major tracking technologies are available to police: beepers, or
"bird dogs," and GPS trackers.
1. Beepers
"A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits
periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.', 22  Once the
beeper is placed on the target item, a police officer uses a receiver to track
the location of the beeper by determining its position relative to his.
Officers then maneuver into a position where the target item can be
followed and/or sighted.
Beepers are passive-they neither collect nor store data. Rather, they
simply emit electronic pulses which can be picked up and followed. Their
value thus depends on the ability of monitoring officers to physically
maneuver and locate the object in question. In contrast, GPS devices
independently acquire and store data which is substantial and precise.
2. GPS
GPS is a network of at least twenty-four satellites which continuously
send radio signals transmitting their locations; receivers on earth triangulate
their own three-dimensional position using information from at least four of
the satellites.23 The position "fix" a receiver creates consists of current
longitude, latitude, and time.24
Fixes, when recorded, become a track, or chronological record, of
travel.25 A typical track is accurate up to fifteen feet and two miles per hour
22 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
23 Aaron Renenger, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 549,
550 (2002).
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of speed, but tracks can be adjusted to record position more frequently,
giving a more detailed representation of the target's path.26
The memory in many GPS units is designed to hold only a fraction of the information
that the GPS [device] actually possesses. Accordingly, a user must download GPS
track... information, either by physical connection to a computer or with a GPS
transceiver, a radio, or a cell phone connection. Even inexpensive commercially
available software and a small personal computer can extract speed, exact position,
distance traveled, and travel times, and can overlay the traveled track on maps or
aerial photographs... available on the Internet.
27
Most GPS tracking devices are "about the size of a paperback book
and can be affixed to a car's undercarriage with a magnet. Manufacturers
say... [their] cost-about $1,000-is headed down as the market" for the
devices expands.2 8 Police agencies say these systems pay off because "it
costs more to keep a team of officers on a suspect's trail than [it does] to
download information from a computer. 29
One model, which a Law Enforcement Technology Magazine reviewer
called a "vehicle tracking system that would make James Bond envious,"
sells for $2,396 per unit.30 Users pay $59 per month of tracking data used.31
The product can be attached to a car in thirty seconds and operates
anywhere in the United States, Canada, and Mexico where cell towers
exist.
32
GPS tracking is precise but not foolproof. In the Scott Peterson
murder case, for instance, trackers attached to motor vehicles Peterson used
at times showed him traveling at 38,000 miles per hour33 and at 489 miles
per hour.34 In addition, a device placed in Peterson's deceased wife's car,
26 Id. at 10-11.
27 Id
28 Richard Willing, Surveillance Gets a Satellite Assist: Police, Courts Still Sorting Out
Legality of Using GPS to Track Suspects, USA ToDAY, June 10, 2004, at A3.
29 Brendan Lyons, GPS Does the Legwork as Cops Track Suspects, TIMES UNION, Oct. 5,
2004, at Al.
30 John Bella, GPS Web Device, LAW ENFORCEMENT TECH. MAG., Oct. 2002, at 170,
available at http://www.spycompany.com/let/let%20pg%20170.htm.
31 See Covert GPS Vehicle Tracking Systems LLC, http://www.covert-gps-vehicle-
tracking-systems.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
32 Id.
33 Garth Stapley, Expert: GPS Device Malfunctioned, But Data Good, MODESTO BEE,
Sept. 13, 2004, available at http://www.modbee.com/reports/peterson/trialupdates/story/
9 136 7 15p- 10036582c.html.
34 Jim McKay, Nowhere to Hide: Location Tracking Technology Arrives on the Law
Enforcement Scene, GOV'T TECH., June 2004, at 7, available at
http://www.govtech.net/magazine/story.print.php?id=90490.
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which he drove, did not work for a three-week period.35 Carports, tunnels,
and parking structures can block a tracker's GPS signal.36 Finally, after
downloading to a computer, GPS tracks "are no different from any other
data file-they can be manipulated (like a sound recording), corrupted, or
accidentally erased. 37
B. USE OF GPS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Law enforcement agencies use GPS in a variety of situations,
including:
MURDER INVESTIGATIONS: In the Scott Peterson case,
mentioned above, GPS tracks showed suspect Peterson made at least five
visits in January 2003 to the Berkeley, California marina near the place
where his victims washed up.38 Peterson's visits suggested "a pattern of a
criminal returning to a crime scene. 39
In Washington State, a GPS track from a device placed on a murder
suspect's vehicles showed him stopping at two sites.40 Police found
incriminating evidence at the first site and a grave containing the victim's
body at the second.41 In another Washington case, a dog kept bringing
home human bones.42 Sheriffs deputies fitted the dog with a GPS device
and followed him back to the body.43
DRUG INVESTIGATIONS: In one case, police placed a GPS
tracker on a drug suspect's vehicle and used it to track the suspect to and
from a marijuana field."
Moreover,
[law enforcement may use GPS movement 'profiling' to follow a conspiracy without
the conspirators' knowledge .... [A]n entire drug ring might be detected if officers
attach a GPS [tracker] to an informant's car and make a controlled buy. Officers
could then watch the drug house and... attach GPS units to other vehicles stopping
there, then raid the drug house. Shortly thereafter, officers could recover the GPS
units and see what possible new drug houses the patrons of the first house are using.
The process unfolds in this second tier as it did in the first, and can be repeated
35 Id.
36 Bella, supra note 30, at 172.
37 Schumann, supra note 24, at 11.
38 Stapley, supra note 33.
39 Id.
40 State v. Jackson, 46 P.3d 257, 261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
41 Id. at 261-262.
42 Maureen O'Hagan, Court to Rule if Police Need Warrant for GPS Tracking, SEATTLE
TiMES, May 20, 2003, at B1.
43 Id.
44 United States v. Mclver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999).
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multiple times. In each case, officers will look for short stops at residences or
businesses with a lot of volume, and tracks from suspected buyers going to such
houses. No one will be detained or questioned until the status of the residence as a
drug house is established.., with a controlled buy... and probably not until the
entire [drug] ring is rounded up .... [I]nnocent citizens' lives are not disrupted in any
way.
The time and resources needed to accomplish the same task without
GPS devices would be prohibitive.
ROBBERY INVESTIGATIONS: In Nassau County, New York,
police placed a GPS tracker on the car of a robbery suspect, used the device
to tail the suspect in real time just before his arrest, and then used its track
as evidence placing the suspect in the vicinity of several robberies.46 In
Durham, New Hampshire, police used a GPS tracker attached to the car of a
suspect to track and catch "Jack the Snipper," a serial intruder who cut
clothes from sleeping women living near the University of New
Hampshire.47
PUBLIC CORRUPTION: In Clinton Township, New Jersey,
complaints about police loafing prompted an internal affairs officer to place
GPS trackers on several department patrol cars.48 The investigation
subsequently caught five officers whom GPS tracks showed loitering over
meals or hanging out in parking lots when their official logs listed them as
patrolling township streets or watching for speeders on local highways.49
Four officers pleaded guilty to filing false records and were barred from
working in New Jersey law enforcement; a fifth was convicted at trial on a
records violation.5 °
In Milwaukee, city police placed a GPS tracker on the department-
issued car of the city's second-ranking police officer to help determine
45 Schumann, supra note 24, at 60-61.
46 People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, slip op. (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. May 6, 2004),
available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2004/2004_50358.htm.
47 Brian DeKoning, Police Reveal They Used GPS to Track "Snipper" Suspect, UNION
LEADER, Aug. 4, 2004, at A2.
48 Charles Forelle, GPS Units Keep Tabs On Employee Loafing, CAREERJOURNAL.COM,
http://www.careerjournal.com/hrcenter/articles/20040603-forelle.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2005).
49 Id
so Id. During one disputed period, the fifth officer's activity log showed him checking a
residence, a cemetery, and several car dealerships while his GPS track placed him in a
McDonald's parking lot. Id.
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whether he violated a local law requiring the officer to live in Milwaukee
proper.'
PROBATION VIOLATIONS: In northern California, local police
used a GPS device to track the motor vehicle movements of a convicted
child sex offender.52 The GPS track placed the suspect .16 miles from his
victim's grade school53 despite a court requirement that he remain at least
one mile away.54 His probation was revoked and he was sentenced to six
years in prison.
5
HOSTAGE SITUATIONS: In Clayton County, Georgia, fifty new
school buses were equipped with GPS. 56  The school system was
"apparently attempting to avoid incidents such as the one that occurred last
January in Pennsylvania when an armed man took thirteen children hostage
on a 160-mile trip along the eastern seaboard. Frantic parents worried about
their children's location as helicopters searched for the hijacked bus."57
GPS is thus applicable to a wide variety of law enforcement problems
and offers police substantial assistance in each situation.
III. DISCUSSION
A. FEDERAL LAW
1. Fourth Amendment Basics
Courts -adjudicating cases involving the use of tracking technology
analyze this issue under the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures.
58
A "search" occurs when a government agent infringes on an
expectation of privacy society considers reasonable. 59 "Precisely what is
51 John Diedrich, Police Investigate Assistant Chief's Residency: He Keeps Apartment in
Milwaukee, House in Country, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2004, at B1, available at
http://www.jsonline.com/news/ metro/oct04/263644.asp.
52 People v. Obujen, No. H026715, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2017 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005).
" Id. at *15.
54 Id. at *8.
51 Id. at *19.
56 John Marshall National 2002 Moot Court Competition in Information Technology and
Privacy Law: Brief for the Respondent, 21 J. MARSHALL J. CoMPuTER & INFO. L. 99, 114
(2002).
57 Id.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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reasonable varies from case to case. '6°  A "seizure" occurs when the
government interferes meaningfully with an individual's possessory interest
in property.6' Such interference occurs, inter alia, when the government
intentionally interferes with freedom of movement.62
While the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against certain types of
government intrusions, it does not provide a general constitutional right to
63privacy. The Supreme Court has held that such a general "right to be let
alone by other people ... is left largely to the law of the individual
States." 64  This distinction is critical both to understanding GPS
jurisprudence and to differentiating federal and state law on the subject.
65
Three cases form the core of federal law governing the use of tracking
technologies: Katz, Knotts, and Karo.
In Katz, a 1967 decision, FBI agents attached an electronic listening
and recording device to the outside of a phone booth Katz used in illegal
gambling.66 The government used the evidence to convict Katz of wire
fraud.67
While the device did not physically penetrate the phone booth in which
Katz spoke, the Supreme Court found that the government violated the
Fourth Amendment because its actions "violated the privacy upon
which... [Katz] justifiably relied when using the telephone booth. ,,68
Katz, in other words, had a reasonable expectation of privacy while
speaking inside the booth, an expectation the listening device violated
through its functional penetration thereof.
In federal constitutional terms, privacy is not a function of geographic
place, but rather place relative to privacy expectations which society deems
legitimate. The determination whether any given locale legitimizes an
expectation of privacy rests not on whether the place can be categorized and
given a constitutionally significant geographic label, but instead on whether
it is conceptually linked with intimacy and personal privacy.69
60 United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 945 (6th Cir. 1980).
61 Id.
62 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,450 (1990).
63 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
64 Id. at 351.
65 See discussion infra Parts III.F.2.a, III.F.2.b.
66 389 U.S. at 348.
67 id.
68 Id. at 353.
69 Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy An Emerging
Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAN]:. L. REV. 1077, 1112 (1987). Alternatively, a reasonable
expectation of privacy "usually expresses a conclusion that an individual's privacy interests
1333
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That concept, however, is limited: while overturning Katz's
conviction, the Supreme Court also noted that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.,
70
United States v. Knotts marked the first time the Supreme Court
considered the issue of electronic tracking devices.71 In Knotts, Minnesota
law enforcement officers placed a beeper inside a container of chloroform
they suspected would be used to manufacture illegal drugs.72 After the
suspect purchased the container, officers followed the car in which the
container was placed, maintaining contact by monitoring the beeper signals
and by visual surveillance. 73 Using the beeper alone, police tracked the
container to a secluded cabin in Wisconsin.74 After obtaining a warrant,
officers raided the cabin, finding the container in question and an illegal
drug laboratory.75
The defendant moved to suppress the government's evidence, arguing
that the warrantless use of the beeper violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. 76 Relying on Katz, the Court conducted a two-part inquiry: first,
whether the individual, through his conduct, exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy, and second, whether that subjective expectation was
one society would recognize as reasonable.77
The Court ruled that the suspect had no reasonable expectation of
privacy when he traveled on public roads. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
A person traveling . . . on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another. When (the suspect] traveled
over the public streets[,J he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the
fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of
whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from
public roads onto private property.
78
outweigh the interests of society." Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 295, 332 (2004).
70 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. One observer writes, "In the federal courts, just the possibility
of being seen, rather than the fact of being seen by law enforcement agents is all that is
necessary to avoid Fourth Amendment search restrictions. What law enforcement officials
could have perceived with their ordinary senses from and in public locations is not
considered a search at all." Glancy, supra note 69, at 350 (emphasis added).
71 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
72 Id. at 278.
73 id.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 279.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 280-81.
71 Id. at 281-82.
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Moreover, Rehnquist noted, "[v]isual surveillance from public places
along [target] Petschen's route or adjoining ... [the premises in question]
would have reveal[ed] all of these facts to the police. The fact that the
officers.., relied not only on visual surveillance, but also on the use of the
beeper ... does not alter the situation."
79
Put another way, nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibits police
"from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them ....
Previewing arguments that would be made in later GPS cases, the
defendant argued the technological capabilities of a beeper were such that,
without warrants, twenty-four hour surveillance "of any citizen of this
country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision.",81 The
Court disagreed, noting that "if such dragnet-type law enforcement
practices... eventually occur, there will be time enough... to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable. 82 Notably,
the Court added, "We have never equated police efficiency with
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.
', 83
Less than two years later, law enforcement use of beepers was again
challenged in United States v. Karo, but this time with a different result.
In Karo, Drug Enforcement Administration agents installed a beeper in
a can of ether they suspected was being used, to extract cocaine from
clothing imported into the United States.84 Agents used the device to track
the movement of the can and to monitor it inside a house in Taos, New
Mexico.85 The agents then used that information to secure a search warrant
for the house.86
The Supreme Court dismissed challenges to the installation of the
beeper because doing so did not meaningfully interfere with any of the
affected parties' possessory interests and was therefore not a search.87 "At
most," the Court noted, "there was a technical trespass on the space
occupied by the beeper... [But] a physical trespass is only marginally
relevant to... whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated....
" Id. at 282.
80 Id.
8 Id. at 283.
82 Id. at 284.
83 id.
84 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
85 Id. at 709-10.
86 Id. at 710.
87 Id. at 712.
8 Id. at 712-13.
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Instead, the Court focused on the monitoring of the beeper while inside
the house in question. It framed the legal question it faced as "whether the
monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual
surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a
justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence."
89
Had a DEA agent entered the residence to verify the ether's presence
without a warrant, the Court wrote, "there is little doubt" the search would
have been illegal. 90 For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, "the result is
the same where, without a warrant, the Government surreptitiously employs
an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have obtained by
observation from outside the curtilage of the house." 91 Warrantless, device-
based tracking inside a protected space therefore violates the Fourth
Amendment.
2. Limits on Fourth Amendment Protection
The Fourth Amendment, while powerful in protecting against intrusion
into the home and other areas deemed legitimately private, is limited in
scope. As mentioned above, Katz shows that Fourth Amendment protection
depends not simply on place, but also on privacy expectations society
deems legitimate. Such legitimation "must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society.,9 2 A burglar surreptitiously working in someone else's home, for
instance, may have an expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the
law deems legitimate.
93
Second, while the curtilage of a home receives heightened protections,
those protections also have limits. In California v. Ciraolo, for instance,
the Supreme Court upheld warrantless aerial observation of a fenced-in
backyard within the curtilage of a home.94 Airborne officers spotted and
89 Id. at 714.
90 Id. at 715.
91 Id.; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986) ("The protection
afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area
intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy
expectations are most heightened."); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)
("[The curtilage is the] area to which extends the intimate activity associated which the
'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."').
92 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1979).
93 Id.; see also United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 942 (6th Cir. 1980) (listing cases
involving contraband in which courts found no legitimate expectation of privacy).
14 476 U.S. at 212-13.
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photographed several marijuan?, plants, then used that information to obtain
a search warrant.
95
In finding no Fourth Amendment violation, the Court noted that the
observations in question took place within publicly navigable airspace and
were conducted in a physically unintrusive manner.96 "Any member of the
public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything.., the officers observed., 97  In an age of routine air travel,
Ciraolo was unreasonable in expecting his marijuana plants to be protected
from aerial observation.
98
More generally, things plainly visible from public aerial thoroughfares
do not warrant Fourth Amendment protection. The fact that a generally
available technology-airplanes-facilitated the observation further
supported the Court's ruling.
Third, the Fourth Amendment does not extend to activities undertaken
in public. In United States v. Alonso, for instance, the Tenth Circuit upheld
warrantless use of a beeper to track an airplane police targeted in a drug
smuggling investigation.99 Relying on Knotts, the appeals court noted that
such scientific or technological enhancement of visual surveillance of
suspects in public routes "raises no constitutional issues which visual
surveillance would not also raise."' 100 Per Knotts,
monitoring signals from an electronic tracking device that tells officers no more than
that a specific aircraft is flying in... public airspace does not violate any reasonable
expectation of privacy .... [N]o Fourth amendment violation results from such public
detection. The movement of an airplane in the sky, like that of an automobile on a
highway is not something in which a person can claim a reasonable expectation of
• 101
pnvacy.
3. The Fourth Amendment Applied to Cars
GPS trackers are often used to track motor vehicle movement. An
examination of the Fourth Amendment as applied to cars is thus pertinent.
Supreme Court rulings have defined significantly reduced expectations
of Fourth Amendment privacy in motor vehicles since those vehicles
" Id. at 209.
96 Id. at 213.
97 Id.
9' Id. at 214.
9' 790 F.2d 1489, 1495 (10th Cir. 1986).
'o' Id. at 1494 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983)).
o' Id. (emphasis added).
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provide transportation and rarely serve as a residence or repository of
personal effects. 10 2 Cars,
unlike homes, are subject to pervasive[,] ... continuing governmental regulation and
controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements .... [P]olice
regularly stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have
expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise.., are noted,
or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.
103
The Supreme Court permits warrantless seizures of cars absent
individualized suspicion by allowing sobriety104 and U.S. Border Patrol
immigration checkpoints. 05 Police may also open vehicle doors without
warrants to determine a car's vehicle identification number (VIN).0 6
GPS trackers are typically attached to the outside of a car, an area to
which federal courts grant almost no protection. The Tenth Circuit, for
example, noted that the undercarriage of a car "is part of the car's exterior,
and as such, is not afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy., 10 7 That
ruling was based in part on the Supreme Court's Cardwell v. Lewis
decision, which said that taking paint scrapings from the exterior of a car
parked in a public parking lot did not require probable cause or a warrant.
10 8
Seven years after Cardwell, a federal district court said the warrantless
installation of a beeper on the outside of a vehicle "does not violate the
Fourth Amendment since the expectation of privacy is low and the
intrusiveness is not so great."
109
The already-limited Fourth Amendment protections available to
persons in public, then, do not apply to cars because those vehicles can be
searched or seized without warrants under a variety of circumstances.
B. LATEST FEDERAL GPS CASES
At present, federal courts have only specifically considered the use of
GPS trackers three times. However, only one of these cases considered the
unique technological capabilities of GPS in rendering its decision.
102 New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1986).
103 Id. at 113.
104 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
105 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
106 Class, 475 U.S. at 114.
107 United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir. 1993).
108 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974).
109 United States v. Strmel, 574 F. Supp. 793, 802 (E.D. La. 1983). Similar reasoning is
evident in the Supreme Court's decision upholding anti-narcotics canine sniffs around the
exterior of cars during roadside stops by police. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
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The Ninth Circuit decided the first case, United States v. Mclver, in
1999.110 Narcotics agents without a warrant placed both a GPS tracker and
a "bird dog" beeper on the undercarriage of a suspect's sport utility vehicle
while it was parked in his driveway."' The case facts were such that the
circuit court deemed the vehicle's location to be outside the curtilage of the
home in question.
1 12
The circuit court ruled that the warrantless installation was proper for
two reasons. First, suspect Mclver never proved that he intended to
preserve the vehicle's undercarriage as private-that is, "free from
warrantless government intrusion."'1 13 Hence, the court could not find that a
search had occurred. Second, Mclver never presented evidence that
placement of the tracker deprived him of dominion and control of his
vehicle or caused any damage to its electronic components.' 14 Thus, no
seizure occurred either. Together, these facts meant that the installation did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.
In the second case, United States v. Berry, the Federal District Court
for the District of Maryland hypothesized that GPS-based tracking might
fall outside the Knotts precedent, but did not reach that issue in its ruling.115
There, police obtained a court order from a Baltimore County Circuit Court
to install a GPS tracker under the bumper of a suspect's vehicle.1 16 Police
used information gathered from the device to obtain a search warrant issued
by a federal district court and later found heroin and drug paraphernalia
during their search. 
1 17
The federal court relied upon the valid state court search warrant in
denying the defendants' suppression motion."' However, the court also
suggested that GPS might fall outside the beeper precedents discussed
supra based on a comparison between beepers and GPS trackers.
Specifically, the district court said that GPS effectively served as a
substitute for police surveillance during the investigation.' 19 This use
distinguished the case from beeper cases in which tracking technology
10 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Eberle, 993 F. Supp. 794 (D.
Mont. 1998).
"' Mclver, 186 F.3d at 1126. The GPS tracker used in this case malfunctioned after
three days. Id. at 1123.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1127.
114 Id.
11' 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004).
116 Id. at 367.
117 Id.




merely augmented visual surveillance. In contrast, police stored movement
information on the GPS device and later downloaded it.120  In practical
terms, the device "neither assisted the police in 'tailing' ... [the suspect's]
vehicle nor told them where the car was currently located.' 121  This
temporal disconnect meant the use of the device might not qualify as a
sensory enhancement. The court thus limited its definition of "sensory
enhancement" to devices used in real-time during surveillance operations.
Consistent with this definition, the court observed that more
sophisticated GPS devices can track a target in real time, showing the
target's location on a-map.122 Such advanced versions, the court said, might
"be viewed as a more sophisticated beeper" and thus would not invade a
reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.123  Even so, the court
suggested that the substantial amount of data GPS devices provide and their
ability to store such data might prompt the Supreme Court to consider the
technology "so intrusive that . . . police must obtain a court order before
using it.,"
124
The Berry court relied on the recording capability of GPS to question
the technology's status as a sensory enhancement that would be excused
from warrant requirements. However, this approach was both different






125 In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court effectively defined "sensory
enhancement" when it ruled that government use of a "device not in general public use to
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion" is a "search" requiring a warrant. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). This is consistent with
the Court's ruling in Karo, discussed supra. Notably, the Kyllo Court did not include a
recording, or backward-looking, capability in setting this standard.
Some state and federal courts "have distinguished between devices that 'improve'
human senses and devices that 'replace' them, with the latter being more likely to implicate
the Fourth Amendment." Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical
Surveillance: The American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 383, 395 (1997) (emphasis added). For instance, a device which
sees through walls could be said to replace one's senses ... because it sees things that the police
might never be able to see with the eye. Conversely, when enhancement devices simply
'confirm' something already seen by the naked eye, or see something that could be viewed with
the naked eye but for fear of discovery, the use is less likely to be seen as a search ..
Id. at 396 (emphasis added); see also Glancy, supra note 69.
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rulings. 126 As such, it provides a questionable challenge to the warrantless
use of GPS under federal law.
In the third case, United States v. Moran, narcotics agents installed
GPS devices on a suspect's vehicle without obtaining a warrant. 127 The
court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained
through the devices, relying on Knotts dicta that a person traveling on
public thoroughfares has no legitimate expectation of privacy. 128 Police in
Moran were investigating alleged drug trafficking by members of the Hell's
Angels biker gang.
129
C. KYLLO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR GPS
The Supreme Court's ruling in Kyllo v. United States articulates a
standard governing when a particular police technology implicates Fourth
Amendment concerns. In Kyllo, police used a thermal-imaging device to
determine whether the occupants of a triplex were using high-intensity
lamps to grow marijuana inside their home.130 The Court found that the use
of the device constituted a search because it enabled police to obtain
information about the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physically entering that protected space, "at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. 131
The dissent called this approach a "new rule."'
' 32
According to one commentator, the Court's reference to the "general
public" centers on "openness to all people without restrictions to any class
or group within the community.' 133 State court decisions provide many
pre-Kyllo examples of judicial reliance on this general public use
126 Federal courts have approved warrantless surveillance of activity in public through
other types of recording devices. In MR v. Lincolnwood Board of Education, for instance, a
federal district court relied on multiple precedents in finding that "videotaping in public
areas does not violate any constitutional right of privacy nor constitute an illegal search or
seizure." 843 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1994). In that case, the recording capability of
the technology in question served as a substitute for the real-time presence of human
observers. Nevertheless, the court found no issue with that arrangement.
127 349 F. Supp. 2d 425,467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
128 Id.
129 Brendan Lyons, Ruling Gives Cops Leeway with GPS, TIMES UNIoN, Jan. 11, 2005, at
Al.
130 533 U.S. at 29.
131 Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
132 Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Douglas Adkins, The Supreme Court Announces a Fourth Amendment "General
Public Use" Standard for Emerging Technologies but Fails to Define It: Kyllo v. United
States, 27 U. DAYTON L. REv. 245,253 (2002).
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rationale. 134  Federal courts "have used this same kind of language in
concluding that no search occurs when police use zoom or other
magnification lenses to observe curtilage.' 35
This linkage followed the Court's landmark ruling in Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States, where the Court upheld aerial photography of an
industrial complex in part because of the general availability of the
technology federal authorities used.1 36 It "may well be," the Court wrote,
"that surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public.., might be
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.'' 137  However, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency had used "a conventional, albeit precise,
commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking" to conduct
surveillance.138 The use of that easily-obtained technology could not be
used as a basis for invoking Fourth Amendment protections.
Kyllo is thus a logical extension of the technology standard established
in Dow and, to a lesser extent, Ciraolo. Its rule: a surveillance technology's
limited public availability provides a litigant one basis upon which to
invoke Fourth Amendment protection. Conversely, surveillance conducted
with widely-available technology carries some presumption of legal
permissibility. "This standard is associated with an assumption-of-risk
rationale because once the device is in 'general public use,' the public
assumes the risk of protecting itself from the use of that technology."'
' 39
Alternatively, the "focus on public access relies on the assumption that once
a technology becomes available to the public, persons no longer have an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy that would prohibit its use.
', 40
This approach has enormous implications on whether courts could
require warrants for GPS tracking given its increasing penetration into both
the commercial and consumer vehicle markets.
141
134 Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing
Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1393, 1400
(2002).
135 id.
136 476 U.S. 227, 228 (1986).
137 Id. at 238.
138 Id. at 251 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139 Sean D. Thueson, Fourth Amendment Search-Fuzzy Shades of Gray: The New
"Bright Line" Rule in Determining When the Use of Technology Constitutes a Search, 2
Wyo. L. REv. 169, 195 (2002).
140 Amy Miller, Kyllo v. United States: New Law Enforcement Technologies and the
Fourth Amendment, 51 KAN. L. REv. 181, 190 (2002).
141 For a brief overview of the impact of GPS on everyday life, see Francine Brevetti,
Wider Use of GPS May Remap How We Live, OAKLAND TRIB., Jan. 11, 2004, Business, at 1.
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D. INTEGRATION OF GPS TECHNOLOGY INTO U.S. MOTOR VEHICLES
1. GPS-Based Vehicle Tracking Systems
GPS and other remote vehicle tracking technologies are widely present
in the United States. For purposes of a Kyllo analysis, such devices should
be considered "surveillance" devices.
a. Telematics and Fleet Management
A large industry exists around automotive "telematics." "In the
automobile industry, telematics refers to the provision of voice and data
communication between the vehicle and information service providers.' 42
Industry financial analysts predict continued growth in the business. One
market research firm projects the North American market to reach $7
billion by 2007.143
"Fleet management" is one segment of the larger telematics industry.
Commercial trucking companies use Electronic Vehicle Management
Systems (EVMS), many incorporating satellite tracking, to record their
vehicles' geographic locations and to provide near real-time data
connections between drivers and dispatchers. 144 This information enables
dispatchers to better allocate trucks and thereby boost capacity utilization, a
critical factor in a shipper's profitability. 145 In 1992, 11.1 percent of trucks
surveyed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census' Truck Inventory and Use
Surveys used such systems. 46  By 1997, that figure had risen to 24.9
percent. 147 The most popular systems cost only $100 per month per truck to
lease, including messaging costs. 148 One industry analyst predicts that over
1.3 million fleet vehicles-those dispatched as part of a fleet, such as taxis,
buses, delivery vans and tractor-trailers-will be equipped with automatic
142 GLOBAL EQUITY RESEARCH, UBS WARBURG, WORLDWIDE TELEMATICS INDUSTRY:
EYES ON THE ROAD AND HANDS ON THE WHEEL (2000) (emphasis added) (on file with
author).
143 C. Kenneth Orski, The State of U.S. Telematics, http://rji.cc/features/
ITSCooperativeDeployment.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). For more information on
Orski, see Innovation Briefs, http://www.innobriefs.com/about.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2005).
144 Thomas Hubbard, Information, Decisions, and Productivity: On-Board Computers
and Capacity Utilization in Trucking, 93 AM. ECON. REv. 1332 (2003).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1335.
147 Id The Survey is taken every five years as part of the Census of Transportation and
takes a random sample of trucks from vehicle registration records. Id. at 1333.
148 Id. at 1349.
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vehicle trackers by 2005.149 An intemet search finds a large number of
companies offering such services for both long-haul and local fleets.
1 50
In addition, at least one rental car agency equipped its rental fleet with
GPS trackers, then used the technology to fine customers for speeding
while driving their rented vehicles. 151
b. Passenger Car Tracking
Several companies today market GPS tracking devices to parents of
teenage drivers. The devices cost from $140 to over $400 plus monthly
fees for options which use GPS technology. 152 They monitor a vehicle's
path of travel, speed, and length of time spent at a location. 153  Some
devices even notify parents when the vehicle travels outside a particular
boundary or exceeds a certain speed.1
54 Several can be purchased online. 155
149 Charles Forelle, On the Road Again, But Now the Boss is Sitting Beside You, WALL
ST. J., May 14, 2004, at Al.
150 See Advanced GPS Store, http://www.advancedgpsstore.com/gps-tracking-device.asp
(last visited Oct. 10, 2005); Advanced Tracking Technologies, Inc.,
http://www.advantrack.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); Affordable GPS Vehicle Tracking
Systems, http://www. 123-vehicle-tracking.corn (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); Appian Logistics
Software, Inc., http://www.appianlogistics.com/drtrack.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2005);
Employer's Asset Protection, http://www.eaprotection.com/gpstrack/Default.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2005); FleetBoss Global Positioning Solutions, http://www.fleetboss.com
(last visited Oct. 2, 2005); Fleet Management Solutions, http://www.fmsgps.com (last visited
Oct. 10, 2005); GPS Fleet Solutions, http://www.gpsfleetsolutions.com (last visited Oct. 10,
2005); GuardMagic, http://www.guardmagic.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); InSight USA,
http://www.mds-inc.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); Navtrack, http://www2.navtrak.net
(last visited Oct. 10, 2005); MightyGPS.com, http://mightygps.coml
mightygpstrackingsolutions.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); Networkcar,
http://www.networkcar.com/networkcar/pub/main (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); Teletrac,
http://www.teletrac.net (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); Track Your Truck,
http://www.trackyourtruck.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); Vehicle Tracking Using GPS,
http://www.mobiletimeclock.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
151 Renenger, supra note 23, at 554. In 2004, the California State Assembly passed
legislation which forbade car rental companies from using electronic surveillance technology
to monitor renters. Lawmakers Pass Tracking Device Bill, KRON4, Aug. 16, 2004,
http://www.kron4.com/global/story.asp?s=2181927.
152 Michelle Higgins, A Back-Seat Driver for Your Teen's Car, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2005, at Dl; see also Catherine Skipp & Arian Campo-Flores, Spying On Speeders,
NEWSWEEK, June 7, 2004, at 80; Elizabeth Williamson, Teens Taking Parental Spies Along
for the Ride, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2005, § 5, at 1.
153 Higgins, supra note 152.
154 id.
155 Id.
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c. Anti-Theft Systems
Vehicle tracking systems are also available for protection against theft.
One system, made by LoJack Corporation,156 uses a radio frequency
transmitter hidden in a car to broadcast signals when a vehicle is stolen.
157
Police equipped with company-issued tracking equipment trace the signal to
locate the stolen vehicle.1
5 8
LoJack launched its product in 1986.159 Today, the system is installed
in approximately 4,000,000 cars in the United States.' 60  By the end of
2004, police recovered 75,000 stolen vehicles using the system. 161 The
company recently entered the motorcycle market. 1
62
2. Other Relevant Vehicle Location Technologies
a. Passenger Car Navigation
OnStar, a GPS location service provider for private cars, reached the
3,000,000 subscriber milestone in late 2004.163 The service is currently
available on fifty General Motors models and select models of six other
auto makers. 164 GM plans to make the service standard on its new cars and
trucks sold in the U.S. by the end of 2007.165 The company had a twenty-
156 See Lojack, http://www.lojack.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
157 See LoJack, What is LoJack?, http://www.lojack.com/what/how-lojack-works.cfin
(last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
158 Id.
159 Telephone Interview with Jeanne Bock, Spokesperson, LoJack, in Lexington, Va.
(Feb. 23, 2005).
160 Id.
161 Press Release, LoJack Corp., LoJack Recovers Milestone 75,000th Stolen Vehicle
(Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://www.lojack.com/pdf/121304release.pdf.
162 See LoJack, LoJack for Motorcycles, http://www.lojack.com/products-services/auto-
security-system/lojack-for-motorcycles.cfin (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
163 Press Release, OnStar, OnStar Reaches Three-Million-Subscribers Milestone (Dec.
16, 2004), available at http://onstar.intenetpressroom.com/prr_releases_ detail.cfm?id=305.
164 id
165 See GM, Only GM, http://www.gm.com/company/onlygm/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2005); see also Renenger, supra note 23, at 553-54 ("General Motors is [also] integrating
'black box' technology into its cars. Coupled with GPS, the boxes could record exactly
where the car has been and whether the driver was breaking any driving laws."); General
Motors Advertisement, CmH. TRm., Jan. 31, 2005, at A9.
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seven percent share of the U.S. auto market in calendar 2004.166 Police
have used such factory-installed systems to recover stolen vehicles.
167
b. Electronic Toll Collection
Electronic toll collection systems provide government agencies with
another way to track vehicle movement, albeit in a more limited fashion
than with GPS. System subscribers attach transponders to their cars. 168 As
drivers pass through specially-equipped toll plazas, toll charges are debited
from the user's pre-paid accounts.' 69 The systems keep a log of where and
when each customer passes through a participating toll plaza for billing
purposes, thus providing police with one way to track a target's
movement. 170  Several systems exist in the United States today. The E-
ZPass system covers New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia.' 71 The I-Pass
system covers Illinois, 72 and the FasTrak system operates in California.1
73
As of March 2005, the New York portion of the E-ZPass system had
2.8 million active accounts. 174  The I-Pass system issued 1.9 million
transponders through January 31, 2005.175 New Hampshire and Illinois are
expected to join the E-ZPass system shortly.'
76
E. OTHER RELATED CONSUMER APPLICATIONS OF GPS
One additional GPS application bears mention to further illustrate the
general availability of GPS tracking and its increasing integration into daily
166 GM. Not Conceding U.S. Market Share, AUTO CHANNEL, Dec. 4, 2004,
http://www.theautochannel.com/N/news/2004/12/04/295034.html. Market share quoted is
11-month data, not full calendar year. Id.
167 See State v. Clifton, 580 S.E.2d 40, 42 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); see also OnStar, supra
note 163.
168 Timothy Joseph Duva, You Get What You Pay For... and So Does the Government:
How Law Enforcement Can Use Your Personal Property to Track Your Movements, 6 N.C. J.
L. & TECH. 165, 170 (2004).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Telephone Interview with Charlene Allen, Spokesperson, E-Zpass, in New York,
N.Y. (Mar. 3, 2005); see The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, http://www.panynj.gov/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
172 Illinois State Toll Authority, I-Pass, Where Can I Use I-Pass?,
http://www.illinoistollway.com/ (follow "I-Pass" hyperlink; then follow "Where Can I Use I-
Pass?" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
173 See FasTrak, http://www.51l.org/fastrak/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
174 Telephone Interview with Charlene Allen, supra note 171.
175 See Illinois State Toll Authority, supra note 172.
176 Telephone Interview with Charlene Allen, supra note 171.
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life. At present, Federal Communications Commission regulations require
that all new cellular phones activated since December 31, 2002 include
E9 11 ("Enhanced 911") technology, which allows emergency personnel to
locate a 911 caller anywhere in the country via a GPS device contained in
the caller's phone. 177 FCC regulations call for 95 percent of all active cell
phones to be equipped with the technology by December 31, 2005.178 Thus,
"should the government choose to employ them, E911 systems provide a
direct way of tracking any member of the escalating cellular phone user
population. 1 79 This fact is particularly significant since many people use
their phones while driving.
The current extent of vehicle-focused and related GPS technology
available to the public suggests that its use by police should not implicate
Fourth Amendment concerns under Kyllo.
F. GPS LAW IN STATE COURTS
Courts in at least five states have addressed the issue of using beepers
or GPS to track suspect vehicles.
1. States Which Do Not Require Warrants
Relying on Mclver, Knotts, and Karo, a California appeals court ruled
that attaching a GPS monitor to the outside of a vehicle without a warrant
and monitoring its signals while the vehicle traveled public streets did not
violate state law.180  The Supreme Court of Nevada made an almost
identical finding in Osburn v. State. 181
2. States Which Require Warrants
a. Oregon
State courts in Oregon, Washington, and New York require police to
obtain warrants before using vehicle tracking technology. Washington and
New York courts specifically considered GPS in their rulings.
In State v. Campbell, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled that police
use of a beeper constituted a search which required a warrant or an
exigency that would obviate the need for one. 82 Police had used the beeper
177 Duva, supra note 168, at 168.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 169.
180 People v. Zichwic, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733, 742-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
181 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002).
182 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988).
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to track a burglary suspect because the rural nature of the area in which he
lived made covert surveillance impractical. 183 They attached a beeper to the
underside of the suspect's car while it was parked in a public parking lot.
184
At issue was how to interpret Article I, Section 9 of the Oregon
Constitution, the state's analogue to the federal Fourth Amendment.
185
While the text of the Oregon law is similar to that of the federal
Constitution, the Oregon Supreme Court construed its reach more broadly.
Rather than framing the Oregon amendment simply as a protection against
unreasonable search or seizure, the Oregon court described the privacy
interest protected by the amendment as "freedom from particular forms of
scrutiny.
186
Applying that concept to the beeper, the court wrote,
Any device that enables the police quickly to locate a person or object anywhere
within a 40-mile radius, day or night, over a period of several days, is a significant
limitation on freedom from scrutiny .... The limitation is made more substantial by
the fact that the radio transmitter is much more difficult to detect than would-be
observers who must rely upon the sense of sight. Without an ongoing, meticulous
examination of one's possessions, one can never be sure that one's location is not
being monitored by means of a radio transmitter. 187
The Oregon approach specifically rejects the idea that the use of a
particular surveillance technology may be excused from constitutional
burdens either because the target is exposed to public view 188 or because the
technology is merely sense-enhancing.
189
b. Washington
Similar arguments played a vital role in State v. Jackson, a landmark
case involving GPS tracking by police in Washington State.190 The case
provides a striking example of the impact GPS can have in a criminal
183 Id. at 1041.
84 Id. at 1041-42.
185 Compare OR. CONST., art. I, § 9, with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
186 Campbell, 759 P.2d at 1047.
117 Id. at 1048. The U.S. Supreme Court decisions discussed supra make no such
mention of scrutiny per se.
188 Id. at 1045-46 ("The issue is not whether what the police learned by using the
transmitter... was 'exposed to public view,' but whether using the transmitter is an action
that can be characterized as a search.").
189 Id. at 1045 ("Whether police conduct is a search does not turn on whether its object
could be discovered by conduct that is not a search.").
190 46 P.3d 257 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
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investigation and marks the first time that a major court specifically ruled
on police use of GPS technology.
On the morning of October 18, 1999, Brad Jackson called 911 to
report his nine-year-old daughter Valiree missing. 191  Investigators
eventually identified three likely scenarios to explain the girl's
disappearance, one of which involved wrongdoing by Jackson. 1
92
On October 23, authorities obtained and executed search warrants for
Jackson's home and two cars, but found no incriminating evidence.
193
Three days later, police obtained warrants to attach GPS trackers to
Jackson's two vehicles and installed them while the vehicles were
impounded.194 A detective then told Jackson that he knew Jackson had
buried Valiree without sufficient time to keep animals from digging her up
and that the body would be found.195
On November 6 and November 10, police analyzed the GPS tracks.
The November 6 track showed Jackson turning onto an unmarked logging
road, then stopping for 44 minutes at a site the Jackson family had used as a
secret hunting spot.196 The November 10 track showed Jackson stopping at
a second site for sixteen minutes, then driving fifty miles back to the site of
the November 6 track.
197
Investigators inspected both sites. They found the victim's body at the
November 6 site and plastic bags with duct tape containing blood and hair
later matched via DNA to the victim at the November 10 site. 19 8 Additional
forensic evidence recovered at the sites implicated Jackson. 199 Police
arrested Jackson on November 13 .200 He was eventually convicted of first-
degree murder and received a sentence of 672 months
l01
In less than four weeks, police had gone from a report of a
disappearance to recovering the victim's body and other critical forensic
evidence-in substantial part because of information obtained through GPS
tracking.
191 Id. at 260.












Jackson appealed his conviction, arguing, inter alia, that the use of
GPS trackers violated the Washington state constitution. The state
appellate court rejected the argument since police had obtained warrants to
install and monitor the devices.2 °2 That court, however, also ruled that "no
search warrant was required under the state or federal constitution ' 20 3 since
Jackson was tracked after voluntarily exposing his movements in public.
20 4
It ruled this way even though the relevant section of the state constitution
was generally more protective than the Fourth Amendment.2 °5 The court,
however, hedged, writing that it was "not convinced [that] probable cause
for a search warrant will always be irrelevant for GPS use cases. 20 6
Jackson appealed to the Washington Supreme Court. The court
affirmed Jackson's conviction, but reversed the appellate court's GPS
ruling, holding that police had to obtain warrants before using GPS tracking
devices.2 °7
The high court focused on two concerns. First, the court viewed GPS
not as a sense-augmenting device, but, rather, as "a technological
substitute" for police surveillance. 20 8 The court reached this conclusion by
examining the literal application of GPS technology, observing that
when a GPS device is attached to a vehicle, law enforcement officers do not in fact
follow the vehicle. Thus, unlike binoculars.., the GPS device does not merely
augment the officers' senses, but rather provides a technological substitute for
traditional visual tracking. Further, the devices in this case were in place for
approximately two and one-half weeks. It is unlikely that the sheriffs department
could have successfully maintained uninterrupted 24-hour surveillance through this
time by following [suspect] Jackson .... 209
The court perceived "a difference between the... uninterrupted,
twenty-four-hour-a-day surveillance possible through use of a GPS device,
which does not depend upon whether an officer could.., have maintained
visual contact over the tracking period, and an officer's use of
binoculars ... to augment his... senses.210
The court was thus concerned about the way the device expanded the
surveillance capability of law enforcement officers. The court seemed to
view increases in police efficiency-and, therefore, police "reach"--as a
202 Id. at 268-69.
203 Id. at 272.
204 Id. at 269-70.
205 Id. at 270; see also WASH. CONST. art. I, §7.
206 Id. at 272.
207 State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
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danger about which a court should be concerned. This outlook contrasts
sharply with that of the U.S. Supreme Court, which embraced technology-
based efficiency in Knotts.
211
In the case of GPS, that efficiency is so great that, according to the
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, "[i]t is the equivalent of
placing an invisible officer in the back seat of a person's car. ' 212 Accepting
this conception, the device represents a penetration into the otherwise
protected interior of one's car.
Second, relying on the Oregon Supreme Court's Campbell ruling, the
Washington court said GPS would undermine the freedom from scrutiny
guaranteed by the Washington constitution-a protection greater than that
provided by the U.S. Constitution.213
"In this age," the court observed, "vehicles are used to take people to a
vast number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations,
personal ails and foibles .... GPS devices record all of these travels and
thus can provide a detailed picture of one's life., 214 More precisely,
the intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS device is quite
extensive .... [T]he device can provide a detailed record of travel to doctor's offices,
banks... casinos,.., places of worship, political party meetings, bars, grocery
stores,. . . gyms, places where children are dropped off for school, play, or day
care,... the strip club, the opera, the baseball game, the 'wrong' side of town, the
family planning clinic.
Thus, the use of GPS constituted an intrusive search subject to warrant
requirements under state law.216
The fact that GPS trackers in this case were actually wired into the
vehicles' electrical systems for power,217 rather than merely attached to the
outside of Jackson's vehicle without such penetration, may have provided
an intellectual starting point for the court's ruling. This fairly involved,
complex, mechanical arrangement meant that the trespass committed upon
Jackson's property was more than de minimis and, therefore, a legally
211 See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
212 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, In Landmark Ruling, Washington Supreme
Court Says Police Need Warrant for Surveillance with Global Tracking Devices (Sept. 11,
2003) (on file with author).
213 Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223. Unlike federal courts, the Washington Supreme Court
prohibits sobriety checkpoints. Mesiani v. City of Seattle, 755 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1988); see
also State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990) (warrantless search of a person's
garbage); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986) (warrantless use of a pen register).
214 Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
215 id.
216 Id. at 231.
217 Id. at 221.
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significant seizure affecting Jackson's possessory interests in the
vehicles.218
c. New York
A New York trial court recently ruled that law enforcement use of
GPS constitutes a seizure which requires police to obtain a warrant or else
demonstrate exigent circumstances.219 In that case, officers used a GPS
device to track a burglary suspect.
220
While the court discussed the technological sophistication of GPS
relative to beepers,221 its ruling instead emphasized property rights concerns
relative to installation of the device. Those concerns received little
attention in the Oregon and Washington State decisions above.
Judge Joseph Calabrese quoted Federal Circuit Judge Kleinfeld's
concurrence in Mclver, writing:
People care about their cars, planes and boats, and often object vehemently to any
uncontested.., mechanical work or even touching of these valuable effects .... In
the absence of a warrant or applicability of an exception to the Fourth Amendment...
people are entitled to keep police officers' hands and tools off their vehicles.
222
Calabrese himself wrote, "Although... persons have diminished
expectations of privacy in automobiles on public roads and can be tracked
by the police,. . . the mere act of parking a vehicle on a public street does
not give law enforcement the unfettered right to tamper with the vehicle
by... attaching a tracking device .... "
2 3
Ironically, the same property rights concerns Calabrese cited in
creating the new warrant requirement undid the defendant's claim of
unreasonable search and seizure: since he did not own the car to which the
GPS devices were attached, the court ruled that Lacey lacked standing to
218 Id. at 223.
219 People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, slip op. at 8 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. May 6, 2004),
available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2004/2004_ 50358.htm.
220 id. at 1.
221 Id. at 7.
222 Id. at 6 (quoting United States v. Mclver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1133 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Kleinfeld, J., concurring in result and dissenting in analysis)). The federal district court
which issued the Moran ruling strongly criticized this decision, nothing that "despite
surveying cases from other jurisdictions on the issue, the Lacey Court failed to reconcile its
reasoning with that of the United States Supreme Court in Knotts. In fact, the Lacey court
did not even mention Knotts." United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y.
2005).
223 Id. at 8.
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challenge their deployment and the role they played in his arrest.2 24 The
evidence obtained through GPS tracking remained available to prosecutors.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
This Comment argues that on a purely legal basis, current federal
jurisprudence should not find that GPS surveillance of vehicles in public
intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. Secondarily, it provides
additional, policy-based reasons why the law should embrace GPS.
Two basic sides exist in the debate over GPS. The first, argued here,
begins its analysis with the nature of the information gathered through GPS
tracking. Since that information is already public, there is no search or
seizure for purposes of federal law.
The opposing argument begins at a different intellectual starting point.
As explained by Doug Klunder, ACLU of Washington Privacy Project
Director,225 rather than focusing on whether the information gathered is
public or private, this side considers the mere fact that a government agency
collected information about a person to be constitutionally significant.226
Legally, then, the Supreme Court "got it wrong" in Knotts.
227
The major issue from this perspective, then, is the collection of
information, rather than the public character of that data. Given that
outlook, the efficiency a technology delivers in collecting information is
legally significant since that efficiency accelerates and/or enlarges the scope
of constitutionally-offensive behavior.228 Aceording to this side, how
information is gathered is just as important as what information is
obtained.229
The two sides, then, do not so much argue against each other as they
do past each other since they begin at different starting points and follow
224 Id. at 10.
225 Klunder wrote the ACLU's amicus brief cited by the Washington Supreme Court in
its State v. Jackson ruling. See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003).
226 Telephone Interview with Doug Klunder, Privacy Project Dir., ACLU of Wash.. in
Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 6, 2005).
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 See Telephone Interview with Doug Klunder, Privacy Project Dir., ACLU of Wash.,
in Seattle, Wash. (Oct. 10, 2005). Along those lines, Klunder himself adopts the Berry
court's approach to GPS, arguing that the technology's recording capability makes it legally
distinct from beepers. Id. "Since the GPS devices record travel, they do not fall within the
sensory enhancements argument-no enhancement of human senses allows us to 'see' into
the past." Id. This approach, however, lacks support in federal law. See supra note 125.
1353
JOHN S. GANZ
fundamentally separate paths in building their positions. Opponents of
warrantless tracking essentially concede the legal status quo for purposes of
federal law, but argue "that's not how it should be." To the extent they
argue in favor of greater limitations within the current regime, they do so on
policy grounds rather than legal ones. Advocates on both sides must remain
aware of this dynamic to best comprehend and argue this issue.
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST WARRANT REQUIREMENTS
Several powerful arguments favor treating GPS like any other sense-
enhancing technology currently available to police for use without federal
warrants.
1. Legal Arguments
First, in legal terms, the information gathered through GPS is already
publicly observable by either lay persons or police officers. At its core,
GPS is "just a high-tech version of conventional police surveillance."
230
Says one police commissioner, "[i]t's tantamount to a cop following
someone around. There is no listening device, no camera.",
231
As mentioned above, federal law recognizes no expectation of privacy
in what one voluntarily exposes to the public. 232 All of the "associational"
information the Washington Supreme Court mentioned in justifying its
State v. Jackson ruling is, for purposes of federal law, legitimately available
to police--or even random civilians-without a warrant, albeit through
more cumbersome, low-tech means. We may be uncomfortable with the
idea of scrutiny of our public movements, but we have no expectation of
privacy in these movements under well-settled federal law.
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Kevin Korsmo, who argued the State's
case in State v. Jackson, described the Washington Supreme Court's ruling
on GPS surveillance as "a visceral reaction to Big Brother., 233 He asked,
"Why is it private because we didn't have cops following [suspect Jackson]
on the street? ' 234 Ironically, Korsmo said, private citizens in Washington
are not subject to the same restrictions the Washington Court established for
230 Robin Topping, GPS Decision Starts Privacy Debate Anew, NEWSDAY, May 20,
2004, at A17.
231 Id.
232 See discussion supra Part III.A.
233 Telephone Interview with Kevin Korsmo, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Spokane
County Prosecutor's Office, in Spokane, Wash. (Feb. 7, 2005).
234 id.
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police. 235 "What if a private citizen tracks another with GPS and then turns
the information over to police?" he asked.236
Second, GPS does not defeat legitimate expectations of privacy by
intruding into protected spaces. GPS trackers are usually placed on the
exterior of a car, a space which federal courts grant little, if any
protection.237 They do not penetrate the passenger cab and thereby intercept
or record communications, as would listening devices. Since they are not
"effective surrogate[s] for physical entry" into that space,238 they do not
defeat a legitimate expectation of personal secrecy.239 GPS instead records
movement-vehicle location-observable in public. Since GPS does not
violate a legitimate expectation of privacy, it does not "search."
Moreover, when battery-powered trackers are installed on the outside
of a vehicle without wiring them into the vehicle, the devices' operation
does not impinge on the property interests of affected car owners by
penetrating the vehicle. Such models do not meaningfully interfere with
such interests beyond a de minimis level, and hence do not "seize.
240
Third, GPS is already widely available in the motor vehicle context
and may well become ubiquitous in the foreseeable future.24 1 The legal
precedents cited above, especially Kyllo, suggest the public's easy access to
the technology will significantly reduce federal courts' concerns over its use
by police.242
2. Policy Arguments
Several policy arguments augment this legal approach. First, from an
evidentiary perspective, GPS provides the exact sort of data the law should
embrace. Technology-based information is less likely to be distorted than
is evidence based on human perception. Consider the value of DNA in
exonerating wrongly-accused rape suspects and death row inmates 243 or the
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 See discussion supra Part III.A.3. This argument assumes that the GPS device in
question is battery-powered, rather than the ones considered in State v. Jackson and People
v. Lacey. Those devices generated their electrical power through wires which connected the
device to the car in question.
238 Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000) (No. 99-8508).
239 Id. at 17.
240 See discussion supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.3.
241 See discussion supra Part III.D.
242 See discussion supra Part III.C.
243 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005); see also Death Penalty Information Center,
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role video surveillance plays in public corruption and drug investigations.
"Like a DNA readout, GPS evidence does not take sides." 244 In State v.
Jackson, had police followed suspect Jackson to the victim's grave without
using GPS, the discovery would have been a matter of "he said, she said" at
trial, said prosecutor Korsmo. 245 Instead, the GPS data provided a neutral-
and therefore, credible-method of gathering vital evidence.246
Even if a GPS track is not
admissible as primary evidence, it can lead to valuable secondary evidence. Tracks
may jog a witness' memory, give clues to a witness' location at a certain time, or lead
to other evidence that confirms the track technology .... If the GPS track indicates
passing... [a video surveillance camera] in the critical time period, the videotapes'
chronological reference may confirm the track chronology, and thus confirm an alibi
or crime.
The law should embrace those technologies which produce or, as here,
engender more accurate fact finding, perhaps through interaction with other
forms of evidence.
Second, GPS enhances officer safety. Because officers using GPS
trackers need not actually follow a target vehicle, they do not risk being
"made," or discovered by a suspect. As James Mesis, Editor-in-Chief of P1
Magazine, explained, a suspect involved in wrongdoing could discover a
tailing officer.248 Unaware of why they were being tailed, the suspect might
drive to a location where the officer could suddenly find himself "at the end
of a barrel., 249 GPS eliminates the risk of such situations because it enables
police to monitor suspects from an office computer.25°
Third, GPS enhances police investigative efficiency, something critical
for federal officers who bear primary responsibility for homeland security
in the post-9/11 era.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); The Innocence Project,
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
244 Schumann, supra note 24, at 10-11.
245 Telephone Interview with Kevin Korsmo, supra note 233.
246 Schumann, supra note 243, at 10-11.
247 Id. For an example of how police use GPS in conjunction with other surveillance
technologies, see Whitehead v. State, 574 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
248 Telephone Interview with James Mesis, Editor-in-Chief, PI Magazine, in Freehold,
N.J. (Jan. 26, 2005). Mesis, a twenty-five-year veteran of the private investigation industry,
teaches surveillance and investigation courses to both police and private investigators. See
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As mentioned supra, GPS devices cost between a few hundred dollars
and perhaps $2,500, plus the minimal costs of monitoring.25' The U.S.
national average cost of having a private investigator tail a suspect is $60 to
$65 per hour. 2  In urban areas, a minimum of two investigators are needed
to tail a target.253 Thus, a one-person, sixteen-hour tail would, on average,
cost at least $960. In urban areas, the same sixteen-hour tail would require
two people and cost about $1,920. Assuming police surveillance costs at
least this much, these estimates demonstrate the financial economy of using
GPS, particularly in investigations stretching over a period of weeks or
months or which involve multiple targets. Moreover, to the extent an
officer can rely on a GPS device to track a suspect's movements, he is free
to work on other projects during the period of the surveillance.
An empirical study of the impact of the LoJack anti-theft system
provides a related finding in terms of how vehicle tracking technologies
enhance crime control. Among other things, the study found that the arrest
rate for stolen vehicles equipped with the LoJack system was three times
greater-30 percent versus 10 percent-for cars equipped with LoJack than
for those without the product.254 In Los Angeles alone, LoJack resulted in
the breakup of at least fifty-three "chop shops" where criminals disassemble
stolen vehicles for resale of parts.255 Since most thieves are repeat
offenders, arrests that lead to incarceration may also provide social benefits
via reductions in victimizations while the criminal is imprisoned.256
The fact that GPS provides "substitute police officers" should thus be
welcomed as an efficient means to boost the effectiveness of limited law
enforcement resources. To the extent GPS serves as a "force multiplier" by
enlarging the police capability within existing, limited budgets and by
perhaps-as in State v. Jackson-increasing the speed at which law
enforcement brings criminals to justice,257 it serves the thoroughly desirable
end of fighting crime. As the Fifth Circuit explained, many modem
technologies
intrude into areas of citizens' lives that were private in the day of the deerstalker and
magnifying glass .... [But today, these technologies] are used and permitted to be
251 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
252 Telephone Interview with James Mesis, supra note 247.
253 Id.
254 Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities From Unobservable
Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q.J. EcoN. 43,45 (1998).
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See discussion supra Parts II.B, III.F.2.b.
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used because society wants the police function to be efficient. They are needed to
keep police protection abreast of criminal cunning and affordable to taxpayers.
258
In the final analysis, "GPS saves lives, saves money, and saves a
tremendous amount of wasted man hours. 259
C. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF LIMITATIONS
Three major arguments favor requiring warrants for GPS: property
rights, the chilling "Big Brother" effects that government monitoring may
have on civil society, and potential abuse by law enforcement. Ultimately,
only the third withstands scrutiny.
First, a legal, property rights-based argument can be made against
warrantless GPS use260 insofar as installation of GPS trackers intrudes upon
one's property. This argument is based on the idea that the legal essence of
property is the right to exclude.261 However, for purposes of federal law,
current constitutional jurisprudence provides insufficient support for this
argument. In real terms, any "intrusion" by battery-powered GPS units is
minimal since these devices attach to the target vehicle via magnets and do
not interfere with the vehicle's mechanical functioning or the owner's
dominion over it.262 Per Karo, the technical trespass on the space occupied
by a tracking device is "only marginally relevant" in considering whether a
person's privacy has been infringed.263
Second, from a policy perspective, excessive government surveillance
could exert a chilling "Big Brother" effect upon society. The Oregon and
Washington State Supreme Courts found this concern critical in deciding
the Campbell and Jackson cases. This concern prompted the American Bar
Association to issue standards for electronic and physical surveillance. The
standards "state at the outset that technologically-assisted ... surveillance
should be regulated not only when it diminishes privacy, but also when it
25 United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d. 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1981) (Brown, J., concurring).
259 Telephone Interview with James Mesis, supra note 247.
260 See supra Part III.F.2.c.
261 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982) ("The
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an
owner's bundle of property rights."); Dairy Queen of Okla., Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 250 F.2d 503, 506 (10th Cir. 1957) ("[T]he traditional test of ownership is the
power to exclude others.").
262 See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.2. This argument is, however, persuasive when
considering GPS units which are physically wired into a vehicle to draw electric power. In
those cases, the mechanical manipulations involved are clearly more than de minimis,
making the installation a seizure.
263 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1984).
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diminishes 'freedom of speech, association and travel, and the openness of
society. "264
This approach assumes that surveillance necessarily chills social
interaction. Presumably, people will fear, or otherwise be uncomfortable
with being seen and/or heard by a government authority while in public.
Consequently, they may choose to remain in seclusion and/or silence
whenever possible. Recent, albeit anecdotal, evidence suggests otherwise.
The City of Chicago currently operates roughly 2,000 surveillance
cameras to monitor public areas and plans to add 250 more units by 2006.265
The City is upgrading the system with a computer program which
recognizes and alerts police camera monitors to suspicious behavior, such
as setting down a package and walking away from it.266 "Dispatchers will
be able to tilt or zoom the cameras, some of which magnify images up to
400 times, in order to watch suspicious people and follow them from one
camera's range to another's."267  The city's upgraded network "will
embrace cameras placed not only by the police department, but also by a
variety of city agencies including the transit, housing and aviation
authorities.2 68 Chicago Police say the cameras have been critical over the
last eighteen months in reducing street-based drug dealing that leads to
gang violence. 69
Has the current system chilled social interaction? Ron Huberman,
director of Chicago's Office of Emergency Management and
Communication, says, "no". "The feedback we're getting is that people
welcome this. It makes them feel safer., 270 One community organizer who
works in a high-crime neighborhood said the 2,000 cameras now in place
have reduced crime and "were 'having an impact, no if's, and's or but's
about it.'
' 271
264 Martin Marcus & Christopher Slobogin, ABA Sets Standards for Electronic and
Physical Surveillance, 18 CRIM. JUST. 5, 16 (2003).
265 Stephen Kinzer, Chicago Moving to Smart Surveillance Cameras, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
21, 2004, at A16.
266 Id; see also Hal Dardick, City Will Keep Eyes Peeled Big Time, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11,
2005, § 2, at 1.
267 Kinzer, supra note 264.
268 id.
269 David Heinzmann, Smile, You're On Candid Cop Cam, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2005, at
Al.
270 Kinzer, supra note 264.
271 Id. One review of the impact of surveillance cameras on crime in Europe said that "a
fair conclusion is that well-positioned, sophisticated cameras, run by competent staff, might
be able to reduce some types of street crime, particularly theft, by 10 to 25 percent in 'high
crime' areas, compared to similar public areas that have no cameras, with only a small
displacement effect." Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance Of Public
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Authors Ian Ayers and Steven D. Levitt confirmed a similar effect
through empirical analysis of the LoJack system on car theft.272 Auto thefts
per capita fell 17.4 percent in the four years after introduction of LoJack,
compared to no change for non-LoJack cities.273 The authors estimated the
marginal social benefit of installing LoJack to be fifteen times greater than
the marginal social cost.274 "It is clear," the authors wrote, "that LoJack
affects criminal behavior, even at low penetration rates" within a particular
locale.275
These results suggest the impact of surveillance in general-and
vehicle tracking in particular-may be more dynamic and positive than
critics assert. To the extent surveillance enhances public safety-either
through efficient resolution of criminal cases276 or deterrence of criminals-
it enhances the quality of life and may thereby increase social interaction
among law-abiding citizens.
Finally, again from a policy perspective, some might argue that the
failure to require warrants could lead to arbitrary and capricious use of GPS
by police. As dissenting Nevada Supreme Court Justice Robert Rose noted
in Osburn,
The automobile's use is a necessity in most parts of Nevada, and placing a monitor on
an individual's vehicle effectively tracks that person's every movement just as if the
person had it on his or her person .... I fear that in some instances, the monitor will
be used to continually monitor individuals only because law enforcement considers
them 'dirty.' In the future, innocent citizens, and perhaps elected officials or even a
police officer's girlfriend or boyfriend, will have their whereabouts continually
monitored simply because someone in law enforcement decided to take such action.
This gives too much authority to law enforcement and permits the police to use the
vehicle monitor without any showing of necessity and without a limit on the duration
of the personal intrusion.
Rose's observation regarding the basic necessity of a car illustrates the
magnitude of many citizens' vulnerability to abuse of GPS tracking.
However, this valid concern can be met with limits short of warrant
requirements. Police agencies can use internal regulations to prohibit the
use of GPS trackers-or, for that matter, any taxpayer-funded police
Places And The Right To Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213,231 (2002). "Although not based on
controlled studies, statements by American police officials are consistent with this
conclusion." Id. at 231 n.86.
272 Ayres & Levitt, supra note 253, at 53.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 75.
275 id.
276 See supra Parts II.B, III.F.2.b.
277 Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 527-28 (Nev. 2002) (Rose, J., dissenting).
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equipment-for non-law enforcement purposes. Such regulations could be
easily justified as preventing misuse of public resources and can be
enforced through administrative sanctions. Records of such sanctions
would presumably be discoverable by defendants investigated by officers
who were disciplined for such misconduct.
Similarly, the ABA's new guidelines do not include a new warrant
requirement for the use of tracking devices such as GPS. "The Standards
seek neither to expand nor contract those situations that require a
warrant... under the Fourth Amendment., 278 Instead, the Association's
surveillance standards of non-private activity, such as driving in public,
"generally require that the use of surveillance be reasonably likely to
achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective" 279 and that law
enforcement officers articulate how the surveillance will achieve that
objective.28 °
V. CONCLUSION
GPS is an exciting new technology with which law enforcement can
boost its crime-fighting efficiency and improve the quality of evidence
available to juries deliberating in criminal cases.
The existing regime of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence offers little
support for the argument that GPS should be subject to heightened
procedural restraints relative to its technological precursors. The Fourth
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable search and seizure is
confined to a highly limited set of spaces deemed legitimately private and
provides only token protections for movement in public. Americans exist
in a physical space, the vast majority of which allows government scrutiny
and which is punctuated by smaller, highly limited sanctuaries deemed
legitimately off-limits to government. Within this unbalanced context, cars
are granted even less protection than other defined, scrutiny-free areas,
particularly in terms of seizure law. Thus, while GPS is a new technology,
it creates no new legal issues.
278 Marcus & Slobogin, supra note 263, at 14.
279 Id. at 16.
280 Id.
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